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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Institutional investors have become increasingly 
important as equity holders in the most developed 
financial markets. At the same time, their role has 
often changed from passive shareholders to active 
participants in the governance of listed firms (Gillan 
& Starks, 2000). Empirical evidence on engagement 
by institutional investors is mostly limited to the US 
and UK; little research is available for Continental 
European countries, although differences both in 
firm ownership structure and in the institutional 
context may induce a different behaviour by 
institutional investors. 
Concentrated ownership prevails in continental 
European firms: within this context outside 
shareholders have no simple way to influence 
corporate decisions. This may, on one hand, favour 
rational apathy, and generate limited minority 
shareholder dissent at General Meetings (GM). On 
the other hand, lower investor protection in 
Continental Europe (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008) may create additional risk 
of minority shareholder expropriation and generate 
incentives for active, institutional investors to 
engage with companies and to scrutinize GM 
decisions more closely.  
It is often claimed that shareholder dissent at 
European general meetings is low, except in a 
handful of cases2, and that institutional investors 
tend to remain passive, since the costs of activism 
tend to outweigh the benefits. But is this really the 
case? In recent years, regulation created new 
occasions for shareholders to express their voice 
(Masouros, 2010). The possibility to vote on a firm’s 
                                                          
2 Evidence from Renneboog and Szilagyi (2013) indicates that in the main 
European countries management proposals get on average between 95 and 
100 percent of favourable votes. 
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remuneration policy (briefly: Say-on-Pay, or SOP) is 
among them. It has been argued that SOP looks like 
a promising battlefield in particular for small, 
uncoordinated shareholders, which otherwise would 
hardly have an opportunity to give feedback to 
management (Schwarcz-Ziv and Wermers, 2015). 
Furthermore, institutional investors are subject to a 
growing pressure to exercise their stewardship 
responsibilities and actively engage with listed firms. 
Finally, proxy advisors (PAs) operating as 
information intermediaries offer investor services 
that potentially reduce the transaction costs of 
activism. Proxy advisors cover a growing number of 
listed companies in the main European countries 
(Hitz & Lehmann 2017). 
Only anecdotal evidence exists on institutional 
investors’ engagement in Europe. In this paper, we 
use the introduction of Say-On-Pay (SOP) legislation 
in Italy as a natural experiment to investigate 
institutional shareholder activism in a continental 
European country characterised by concentrated 
ownership. Making use of a unique dataset, we 
analyse how different classes of investors (in 
particular, institutional investors) voted on a key 
engagement issue (namely the remuneration policy 
for directors and managers, or Say-On-Pay) in 2012, 
and how their vote is related to Proxy Advisors’ 
recommendations.  
More specifically, we investigate three main 
issues: a) dissent by different classes of 
shareholders, with a particular focus on institutional 
investors; b) the mechanics of such activism at the 
Shareholders’ Meeting (namely, the main drivers of 
voting decisions and whether they are correlated 
with PA voting recommendations) and c) whether 
institutional investors implement PA 
recommendations passively or, instead, look at 
specific elements relevant to their own concerns.  
Our main results may be summarised as 
follows. First, while SOP shareholder dissent in Italy 
is low, in line with other developed countries, 
dissent is surprisingly high amongst institutional 
investors, in particular amongst asset managers 
(typically, internationally diversified mutual and 
pension funds) holding small equity stakes 
(nonblockholders). They are comparatively more 
likely to dissent when they have concerns about 
some aspect of managerial remuneration (in 
particular, when CEO remuneration is “high”).  
Secondly, institutional shareholders’ dissent is 
negatively correlated with ownership concentration: 
the higher the stake held by the controlling 
shareholder, the stronger her incentive alignment 
with minority investors, at least as far as managerial 
remuneration is concerned. This relationship is 
strong and significant for nonblockholders, but not 
for institutional investors holding larger stakes. Our 
evidence is consistent with small institutional 
investors trusting control shareholders to act as 
delegated monitors on CEO remuneration and to 
generate shared benefits of control. 
Thirdly, institutional shareholders’ vote is 
strongly correlated with PA recommendations; this 
is particularly true for nonblockholders, which have 
lower incentives to carry out autonomous research. 
The influence of Proxy Advisors seems at least as 
strong as in the US; this is consistent with the high 
weight of non-domestic institutions within the set of 
institutional shareholders attending GMs of Italian 
listed companies (CONSOB, 2016).  
Finally, institutional investors do not follow PA 
recommendations blindly; on the opposite, they look 
at the specific reasons for concern expressed by 
proxy advisors; in particular, they seem to pay 
particular attention to the governance of CEO 
remuneration (i.e. the composition of Remuneration 
Committee), to the structure of the pay policy and, 
especially, to severance pay.  
We contribute to the existing literature in 
several ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first paper to analyse institutional 
investors’ voting decisions outside the US, and 
specifically in a continental European country 
characterised by concentrated ownership. We show 
that SOP dissent of institutional investors is not 
lower than in Anglo-Saxon countries and is actually 
influenced by several factors, including ownership 
concentration. Moreover, from a methodological 
viewpoint, this is the first paper to perform an 
analysis of the votes actually cast by institutional 
investors at the GM. Differently, from previous 
studies (Ertimur, Ferri, & Oesch, 2013), we are able to 
identify how each institutional investor actually 
voted and, therefore, to investigate directly the 
drivers of voting decisions (including the influence 
of PA recommendations). Finally, our methodology 
allows us to differentiate how different classes of 
investors actually voted and to show that 
institutional investors (in particular, 
nonblockholders) are definitely more “active” than 
the average shareholder.  
Our results are potentially relevant for a 
number of policy issues, including shareholder 
engagement with listed firms, regulation of Say-on-
Pay and of the Proxy Advisory industry, currently 
debated both at the EU level and in the individual 
Member States. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 presents the related literature and briefly 
describes the Italian institutional framework. Section 
3 describes our sample and presents descriptive 
statistics. Sections 4 and 5 present our econometric 
strategy and results. In particular, they analyse if 
(and how) different categories of shareholders vote 
on Say-on-Pay and their relation with several 
variables, including Proxy Advisors’ 
recommendations. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND INSTITUTIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
 
Shareholder engagement at GMs may act as a 
disciplinary mechanism for management and help 
mitigating agency problems (Bebchuk, 2005; Rho, 
2007). When ownership is dispersed, as in the 
typical US public company, small shareholders have 
little incentive to monitor managerial decisions, due 
to well-known free-rider problems (Grossman & 
Hart, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Large 
investors, holding large debt and/or equity positions 
in a company, may help realign the divergent 
interests of managers and owners (Gillan & Starks, 
2000). Institutional investors are a likely candidate 
for this active role: their stake in the ownership in 
US equities increased from about 10% in 1953 to 
over the 70% in 2006 (Gillan & Starks, 2007). A vast 
empirical literature scrutinized the role played by 
active institutional investors, with mixed results: 
some papers show that activism effectively benefits 
shareholders as a class (Becht, Franks, Mayer, & 
Rossi, 2009; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, & Thomas, 2007; 
Buchanan, Netter, Poulsen, & Yang, 2012), while 
others argue that it may decrease value by 
distracting managers from long-term objectives 
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(Black, 1998; Gillan & Starks, 2007; Karpoff, 2001). 
Other contributions analyze which firms are the 
most likely target for active investors and how do 
they respond to engagement efforts (Carleton, 
Nelson, & Weisbach, 1998; John & Klein, 1995; 
Karpoff, Malatesta, & Walkling, 1996; Ong, Petrova, & 
Spieler, 2010; Smith, 1996; Thomas & Cotter, 2007); 
finally, some studies analyze the main issues of 
interest to active investors and how they changed 
over time (Gillan & Starks, 2000). 
Most of this literature focused on countries 
where ownership is typically dispersed (the US and 
the UK). Little is known about institutional investor 
activism in Continental Europe, although notable 
differences in regulation and firm ownership 
structure may affect investors’ behaviour. High 
ownership concentration may discourage minority 
shareholders activism in European firms since their 
vote is unlikely to influence the final voting outcome 
(Renneboog & Szilagyi, 2013). On the other hand, 
under concentrated ownership, the typical agency 
problem faced by institutional investors is the risk 
of expropriation by controlling shareholders 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006), possibly colluding with 
management (Burkart, Gromb & Panunzi, 1997; 
Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003). This conflict of 
interest, associated with lower investor protection 
than in Anglo-Saxon countries, may provide minority 
shareholders with additional incentives to monitor 
managerial and also GM decisions (La Porta, López-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998), 
counterbalancing rational apathy. As a result, the 
overall sign of the effect of ownership concentration 
on institutional investor activism is not easy to 
predict a priori. 
Empirical research on continental Europe is 
quite limited, largely due to data availability 
constraints3. Papers issued by policy makers 
(European Commission, 2006; Hewitt, 2011) find a 
high turnout and a low dissent at GMs of listed 
firms. Academic papers analysing GM activism4 show 
that cases of investor activism are few and not 
particularly effective. De Jong et al. (2005) report the 
absence of shareholders’ proposals in the 
Netherlands and also a limited degree of dissent on 
management proposals. Cziraki, Renneboog, and 
Szilagyi (2010) examine shareholder proposals 
submitted in Europe and find systematic 
underperformance of the (few) companies targeted 
by active shareholders and no market reaction to 
such form of activism. This result is confirmed by 
Buchanan et al. (2012) for the UK market. More 
recently, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2013) analysed 
both management and shareholder proposals 
submitted at the general meetings of companies 
from 17 European countries between 2005 and 
2010. They found that dissent on management 
proposals is correlated with the features of relevant 
national regulation (e.g. companies listed in 
countries with easier cross-border voting procedures 
attract more dissent).  
A specific stream of literature (mostly based, 
once again, on US and UK data) focused on Say-on-
                                                          
3 A rich US-based literature shows that shareholder activism both at general 
meetings (e.g. Ertimur et al. 2011; Renneboog and Szilagyi 2011) and 
behind the scenes (e.g. Bradley et al., 2010; Greenwood and Schor, 2009) 
plays a useful role in addressing managerial agency problems. An exception 
is Armstrong, Gow & Larcker (2013), finding that shareholder votes for 
equity pay plans have little substantive impact on firms’ incentive 
compensation policies.  
4 Evidence on shareholder interventions outside general meetings is 
provided by Armour (2008) and Becht et al. (2009). 
Pay (SOP) votes. According to these studies, a key 
variable driving dissent is the level of CEO pay. 
Other relevant variables are pay-for-performance 
sensitivity, potential dilution from equity grants, 
firm risk and awarded perquisites (Alissa, 2015; 
Balsam, Boone, Liu, & Yin, 2016; Carter & Zamora, 
2007; Conyon, 2016; Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Ertimur 
et al., 2013; Faghani, Monem, & Ng, 2015; Kimbro & 
Xu, 2016). Some papers examine the voluntary 
introduction of SOP by individual German firms 
(Eulerich, Rapp & Wolff, 2012; Powell & Rapp, 2015; 
Troeger & Walz, 2016); in particular, Powell and 
Rapp (2015) show that the fraction of firms 
voluntarily adopting a SOP vote decreased over time 
(from 36.5% in 2010 to 8.5% in 2013). The first study 
addressing the topic in Italy shows that dissent is 
mostly affected (negatively) by ownership 
concentration (Belcredi, Bozzi, Ciavarella, & 
Novembre, 2014).  
The literature on shareholder voting lacks a 
specific focus on institutional investors’ diversity. As 
argued by Celik and Isakkson (2013), minority 
shareholders tend to be seen as a unique block but 
this is hardly true as different categories tend to 
follow different patterns. A vast strand of US 
literature (capitalising on the information available 
due to mandatory disclosure of item-by-item votes) 
has shown that mutual funds vary greatly in their 
voting behaviour, and also in their reliance on PA 
recommendations (Iliev & Lowry, 2015). However, no 
comparable evidence is available for European 
countries, where remarkable differences in the 
institutional context (e.g. in firm ownership 
concentration) may induce a different behaviour by 
institutional investors (Hitz & Lehmann, 2017). 
In this paper, we use the introduction of Say-
on-Pay (SOP) legislation in Italy as a natural 
experiment to investigate institutional investors’ 
engagement with listed firms. Making use of a 
unique dataset, we analyse the behaviour of 
different classes of shareholders (in particular, 
institutional investors) and their relation to PA 
recommendations.  
Say-on-Pay represents an ideal setting to 
analyse shareholder engagement in connection with 
the role of PAs. Institutional investors holding 
diversified portfolios often lack the incentives to 
cast informed ballots5, since information costs for 
every item at each GM of each firm in their portfolio 
may be prohibitively high. In this context, proxy 
advisors may provide a cost-effective service. This 
gives rise, however, to the question whether asset 
managers use actively PA recommendations, 
focusing on specific bits of information provided in 
PA reports, or consider engagement and voting as a 
pure “compliance duty”, and consequently rely 
passively on the final recommendation – “for” or 
“against”. This has, in turn, far-reaching implications 
for the role of proxy advisors: basically, they may 
either provide useful services to investors in a cost-
effective way or may act as delegated monitors, 
using standardised valuation models, potentially 
characterised by issues and conflicts of interest. 
Our paper is linked to the literature 
investigating shareholder votes in connection with 
the role of PAs. A comprehensive picture on these 
issues is provided by Ertimur et al. (2013), showing 
that PA voting recommendations affect say-on-pay 
votes; the sensitivity of shareholder votes to these 
                                                          
5 A thorough analysis of the different business models through which 
institutional investors operate is performed by Celik and Isaksson (2013). 
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recommendations varies according to shareholders’ 
ownership structure, the rationale behind the 
recommendation and firm characteristics. Other 
studies, all based on the US experience, confirm a 
strong association between PA analyses and 
shareholder votes (Alexander, Chen, Seppi, & Spatt, 
2010; Cai & Walkling, 2011; Choi, Fisch, & Kahan, 
2009; Larcker, McCall, & Ormazabal, 2013)6. This 
literature has two main limitations: first, being 
mostly based on US data, no analysis on countries 
where ownership concentration is available; second, 
this literature focuses on the relation between PA 
reports and shareholder dissent, implying that no 
direct evidence is available for the voting decisions 
of institutional investors. Our paper overcomes both 
these limitations since it is based on a Continental 
European country where firm ownership is 
prevalently concentrated and includes data on how 
each shareholder actually voted. 
In Italy we expect a positive correlation 
between institutional investors’ voting choices and 
PAs’ recommendation, and a stronger relation in the 
case of nonblockholders, having stronger incentives 
to outsource research and analysis activities (Choi et 
al., 2009; Ertimur et al., 2013), particularly for 
companies where they hold small equity stakes 
(Agrawal & Nasser, 2012; Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 
2009). This is especially true in the case of 
international funds’ investments in Italian firms, 
only a tiny minority of which may be considered 
sufficiently large to justify the investment in 
independent analysis. 
 
3.  SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS 
 
We investigate shareholder voting at the 2012 
Annual General Meetings when SOP was first 
implemented in Italy. Our initial database includes 
data on shareholder votes (hand-collected from GM 
minutes) and information on the remuneration 
policy and directors’ remuneration (also hand-
collected from Remuneration Reports) for all 
companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange in 
2012 (226 firms). We considered only companies for 
which at least one PA Report (from ISS and/or from 
GL) was available. This leaves a final sample of 188 
companies. 
We track different categories of investors 
separately, since a) they may have different views 
about the firm remuneration policy; b) they may face 
different costs (and benefits) from activism, hence 
have different incentives to engage with companies; 
c) they may be more or less sensitive to PA 
recommendations. This implied a lengthy process of 
hand-collecting and analysing the minutes of 
Shareholder Meetings (which – in Italy – report how 
each shareholder voted on each item on the agenda). 
We are particularly interested in the voting 
behaviour of institutional investors, which have 
                                                          
6 Larcker et al. (2013) confirm the finding that proxy advisory firm 
recommendations have a substantive impact on say-on-pay voting 
outcomes. Cai et al. (2009) examine the factors that determine the 
percentage of “for” votes cast in uncontested director elections and find that 
ISS recommendation reduces the vote in favour of directors by 19 per cent. 
Cindy at al. (2008) analyse the role of ISS in proxy contests and find that its 
recommendations have a high explanatory power for contest outcomes. 
Choi et al. (2009) study the significance of the voting recommendations 
issued by four PAs in connection with uncontested director elections. They 
find a moderate impact of ISS recommendations on voting outcome 
(according to their analysis, an ISS recommendation shifts 6-10 per cent of 
shareholder votes). 
often been recognised as a likely candidate for low-
cost corporate governance activism (Renneboog & 
Szilagyi, 2013; Renneboog & Szilagyi, 2011). 
Following the official definition by Consob (the 
Italian market watchdog), we include in this 
category: a) asset managers and pension funds, b) 
sovereign, hedge and private equity funds, c) banks, 
d) insurance companies. Institutional investors may, 
however, adopt different business models and 
pursue different strategies, also with reference to 
activism. We further differentiate between 
blockholders and nonblockholders (according to 
whether their stake is above/below the mandatory 
disclosure threshold – 2%). The former tend to hold 
relatively large blocks of shares in a small number of 
target firms, and are therefore more likely to engage 
with management. However, most of these 
negotiations take place behind closed doors, and 
dissent will rarely show up at the General Meeting 
(Becht, Franks, & Grant, 2010; Becht et al., 2009); this 
will often happen only after negotiations with 
management have failed. On the opposite, 
nonblockholders usually hold diversified portfolios 
and may have no alternative to “voting no” at the GM 
to express their dissent.  
We measure total dissent as the percentage of 
negative votes cast at the General Meeting (i.e. 
(Against + Abstain)/Total votes: according to Italian 
rules, abstentions are counted as negative votes). 
Recognising that institutional investors often hold 
only a small fraction of firms’ equity capital, we also 
use an alternative measure of dissent (well-known by 
practitioners) calculated as the fraction of negative 
votes cast by institutional investors alone, i.e. 
(Inst.Against + Inst.Abstain)/Total Inst.investor 
votes. 
We control for a number of firms’ 
characteristics. CEO remuneration is measured 
through total compensation (in log terms); the 
variable/total compensation ratio, which may be 
interpreted as a proxy for pay-performance 
sensitivity; disclosure quality, proxied by an index 
built on five remuneration disclosure 
characteristics7. Ownership concentration may have 
a strong influence on the voting outcome and is 
measured in terms of cash flow rights (CFR) owned 
by the ultimate shareholder. We also consider 
institutional investors’ participation at general 
meeting (turnout), measured as the percentage of 
ordinary shares held by institutional investors 
attending the 2012 GM: we interpret this measure as 
a proxy of the (otherwise unobservable) ownership 
stake collectively held by institutional investors (or, 
alternatively, by block- vs. nonblockhoders) showing 
up at the GM. 
Other control variables include firm size (log of 
Total assets); growth opportunities (MV/BV); 
industry (financial/non-financial); firm performance 
(measured, alternatively, in accounting (last year’s 
ROA) and market terms (1-year stock return)); risk 
(standard deviation of stock returns); the quality of 
corporate governance of the remuneration process 
(proxied with the existence of a remuneration 
committee).  
Data on ownership structure and board 
characteristics are drawn from the Consob and the 
Assonime-Emittenti Titoli Corporate Governance 
database, while accounting and stock market data 
come from Datastream-Worldscope. Summary 
statistics are reported in Table 1, Panel A. 
                                                          
7 Detailed variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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Table 1. Panel A: descriptive statistics  
 
Variable n Mean S.D. I Quart. Median III Quart. 
Firm Characteristics 
Total Assets (.000) 188 19,000,000 89,000,000 220,000 720,000 4,500,000 
Market Capitalization (.000) 188 1,700,000 5,500,000 64,108 200,000 890,000 
M/B 188 0.96 2.99 0.44 0.77 1.38 
ROA 188 6% 10% 2% 6% 10% 
RET1Y (%) 188 27% 8% 22% 28% 33% 
SQM_RET 188 1.11 0.78 0.59 0.92 1.29 
CEO Compensation 
CEOTotComp (€.000) 188 1,553 2735 353 852 1,603 
CEO_%_Variable_Comp 188 22% 25% 0% 14% 37% 
Ownership 
Cash_Flow_Rights (%) 188 47% 20% 31% 52% 63% 
Institutional Investors turnout 
Institutional shareholders turnout 188 12% 15% 0% 5% 17% 
Institutional blockholders turnout 188 3% 6% 0% 0% 4% 
Institutional nonblockholders turnout 188 9% 13% 0% 3% 12% 
Dissent 
Total Shareholder Dissent 188 6% 12% 0% 0% 6% 
Dissent of institutional shareholders 159 29% 34% 0% 10% 54% 
Dissent of institutional blockholders 63 11% 3% 0% 0% 0% 
Dissent of institutional nonblockholders 155 32% 34% 0% 17% 63% 
Italian listed companies are usually small-
medium enterprises: the average (median) firm had 
total assets around EUR 19,000 (720) million and a 
market capitalization of EUR 1,700 (200) million. 
The average (median) CEO total compensation 
(including fixed and variable pay) was around 1.5 
million (852 thousand) Euro, including sums 
received by subsidiaries and affiliates. Variable 
compensation was on average the 22% of total 
compensation. Ownership is typically concentrated: 
on average, the largest shareholder held a 47% stake. 
Average total dissent was around 6% of votes 
cast, i.e. somewhat smaller than that recorded in the 
first year of mandatory SOP in Anglo-Saxon 
countries (8.9% in the US in 2011 (ISS, 2011); in the 
UK, the average dissent in 2003 varied between 7.9% 
and 16%, depending on the sample used (Alissa, 
2015; Carter & Zamora, 2007; Conyon & Sadler, 
2010; Ferri & Maber, 2013). A lower dissent is hardly 
unexpected in Italy since concentrated ownership 
prevails and dissent is usually expressed by 
shareholders who are not part of the control group. 
Median total dissent is 0%, implying that in over a 
half of the cases, the remuneration policy received 
unanimous consent.  
Institutional investors’ dissent is, however, 
much higher: average (median) dissent was around 
29% (10%) of the votes cast by this category of 
shareholders. Consistently with our expectations, 
average (median) dissent increases further to 32% 
(17%) amongst institutional nonblockholders 
(basically, mutual and pension funds), which have no 
or little alternative to voting at the GM to express 
their possible discontent. 
Some preliminary evidence of the relationship 
between (institutional) investor dissent and the 
Proxy Advisors’ analysis of the firms’ remuneration 
policy arises from the univariate analysis reported in 
Table 1, Panel B. 
 
Table 1. Panel B: shareholders dissent and proxy advisors concerns 
 
Proxy Advisors analysis of 
Remuneration Policy 
Proxy advisor 
concern 
Total 
Shareholder 
Dissent 
Dissent of 
institutional 
shareholders 
Dissent of 
institutional 
blockholders 
Dissent of 
institutional 
nonblockholders 
ISS: The Remuneration 
Report was not made 
available in a timely 
manner 
No 5.2% 24.9% 3.9% 27.1% 
Yes 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Difference -5.1% -24.9% -3.9% -27.1% 
ISS: Basic features of 
compensation policy NOT 
disclosed 
No 4.7% 20.4% 3.8% 20.4% 
Yes 6.0% 31.0% 3.9% 36.4% 
Difference 1.3% 10.5%** .1% 16.%*** 
ISS: Compensation 
Committee includes 
executives 
No 5.1% 23.0% 3.7% 25.4% 
Yes 6.0% 40.9% 5.6% 41.3% 
Difference .9% 17.9%** 1.9% 16.%* 
ISS: Concerns exist on 
compensation structure 
and LT value creation 
No 5.2% 16.0% 2.7% 17.5% 
Yes 5.1% 33.0% 4.9% 35.9% 
Difference -.1% 17.%*** 2.3% 18.4%*** 
ISS: Severance payments 
exceed 24 months' pay 
No 3.9% 18.4% 3.4% 20.6% 
Yes 11.2% 53.7% 5.9% 55.8% 
Difference 7.3%*** 35.3%*** 2.4% 35.2%*** 
GL: Concern on pay 
structure 
No 4.9% 21.4% 3.1% 24.5% 
Yes 5.8% 43.8% 7.1% 45.0% 
Difference 1.% 22.4%*** 4.1% 20.5%*** 
GL: Concern on pay 
disclosure 
No 4.4% 24.8% 3.2% 27.7% 
Yes 11.1% 48.8% 11.8% 49.5% 
Difference 6.7%*** 24.%*** 8.5%* 21.9%** 
The table presents sample descriptive statistics. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
***, **, * denote significance at the .01, .05, .10 level. 
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First, the dissent of institutional shareholders, 
and in particular of institutional nonblockholders, is 
consistently higher where PAs expressed concerns 
on the remuneration policy. For example, the dissent 
of institutional nonblockholders where ISS 
expressed its concern about Severance payments is 
on average 55.8%, versus an average of 20.6% in the 
case of no concern. The difference is statistically 
significant.  
Second, the increase in dissent in the presence 
of PA concerns is not uniform, but is sensitive to the 
specific nature of each concern (the only exception 
is the ISS concern that “Remuneration Report was 
not made available in a timely manner”; however, 
this concern was issued only in one company, while 
no concern was expressed in the remaining 182 
cases; as a consequence, the difference in dissent is 
statistically meaningless). For example, the increase 
in the dissent of institutional investors is equal to 
10.5% in the case of an ISS concern on the quality of 
disclosure on the remuneration policy, while it is 
equal to 17,9% when the concern refers to the 
composition of the Compensation Committee. 
Although these preliminary results must be 
validated by the multivariate analysis, it seems that 
institutional investors do not follow PA 
recommendations blindly, but critically examine PA 
reports and adjust their vote accordingly.  
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix for the 
main variables used in our analysis. 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix (part 1) 
 
The table reports the correlation matrix for the variables used in the empirical analysis.  
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
***, **, *, denote significance at the .01, .05, .10 level. 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix (part 2) 
 
Variables 
Disclosure 
Index 
Log_CEO_Total_ 
Compensation 
CEO_%_ 
Variable_ 
Comp 
Log Total 
Assets 
M/B ROA 
1 Year 
Stock 
Returns 
SQM_ 
RET 
Cash_Flow
_Rights 
Financial/ 
Nonfinancial 
Total Shareholder Dissent 
          
Institutional Investors' 
Dissent           
Institutional Blockholders' 
Dissent           
Institutional 
Nonblockholders' Dissent           
Turnout Institutional 
Shareholders           
Turnout Institutional 
Blockholders           
Turnout Institutional 
Nonblockholders           
ISS_Against 
          
GL_Against 
          
Disclosure Index 1 
         
Log_CEO_Total_ 
Compensation 
0.295*** 1 
        
CEO_%_Variable_Comp 0.406*** 0.482*** 1 
       
Log Total Assets 0.285*** 0.461*** 0.328*** 1 
      
M/B 0.166** -0.0348 0.0938 -0.0282 1 
     
ROA 0.191*** 0.0969 0.321*** 0.0373 0.241*** 1 
    
1 Year Stock Returns 0.108 -0.0336 0.252*** 0.0315 0.0912 0.286*** 1 
   
SQM_RET 0.0681 0.0211 -0.027 -0.0665 0.0979 0.0569 -0.0399 1 
  
Cash_Flow_Rights -0.196*** -0.169** -0.152** -0.143* 0.103 0.143** 0.0867 0.0361 1 
 
Financial/Nonfinancial 0.00336 0.0419 -0.0561 0.492*** -0.0321 -0.155** -0.12 -0.140* 0.0177 1 
The table reports the correlation matrix for the variables used in the empirical analysis.  
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
***, **, *, denote significance at the .01, .05, .10 level. 
Variables 
Total 
Shareholder 
Dissent 
Institutional 
Investors' 
Dissent 
Institutional 
Blockholders' 
Dissent 
Institutional 
Nonblock-
holders'  
Dissent 
Turnout 
Institutional 
Share-
holders 
Turnout 
Institutional 
Block-holders 
Turnout 
Institutional 
Nonblock-
holders 
ISS_ 
Against 
GL_ 
Against 
Total Shareholder  
Dissent 
1 
        
Institutional Investors' 
Dissent 
0.278*** 1 
       
Institutional 
Blockholders' Dissent 
0.305*** 0.298*** 1 
      
Institutional 
Nonblockholders'  
Dissent 
0.304*** 0.952*** 0.197*** 1 
     
Turnout Institutional 
Shareholders 
0.300*** 0.0727 0.153** 0.0944 1 
    
Turnout Institutional 
Blockholders 
0.149** -0.0966 0.229*** -0.0242 0.549*** 1 
   
Turnout Institutional 
Nonblockholders 
0.286*** 0.129* 0.075 0.122* 0.926*** 0.192*** 1 
  
ISS_Against 0.245*** 0.648*** 0.151** 0.694*** -0.0314 -0.12 0.0168 1 
 
GL_Against 0.144* 0.313*** 0.136* 0.297*** -0.0674 -0.0745 -0.044 0.159* 1 
Disclosure Index 0.117 0.0906 0.0542 0.109 0.395*** 0.0946 0.423*** 0.0338 -0.338*** 
Log_CEO_Total_ 
Compensation 
0.0637 0.232*** 0.0827 0.230*** 0.371*** 0.0336 0.418*** 0.144* -0.0431 
CEO_%_Variable_Comp 0.09 0.257*** 0.0216 0.274*** 0.299*** -0.0213 0.359*** 0.221*** -0.154* 
Log Total Assets 0.127* 0.181** 0.105 0.161** 0.552*** 0.115 0.595*** 0.0362 -0.0964 
M/B 0.0211 -0.0376 0.00526 -0.0255 0.0828 0.0711 0.0628 -0.0809 0.0705 
ROA -0.0119 0.116 0.00807 0.161** 0.186** 0.162** 0.147** 0.0976 0.0201 
RET1Y 0.0932 0.187** 0.0591 0.193*** 0.0783 0.101 0.048 0.126* 0.0163 
SQM_RET -0.0204 -0.000191 -0.0239 0.0261 0.0725 -0.0202 0.0931 0.0591 0.00623 
Cash_Flow_Rights -0.364*** -0.205*** -0.0957 -0.178** -0.439*** -0.166** -0.440*** -0.1 0.02 
Financial/Nonfinancial -0.0696 -0.0837 0.0421 -0.108 0.155** 0.138* 0.119 -0.192*** -0.129 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 14, Issue 4, Summer 2017 
 
47 
Total dissent is positively correlated with 
institutional shareholders’ dissent and turnout at 
GM. Institutional investors’ dissent is strongly 
correlated (and possibly driven) by small 
institutions, as suggested by the coefficient on 
nonblockholders (0.952), much higher than that for 
blockholders (0.298). It is also immediately apparent 
that institutional shareholders’ vote is strongly 
correlated with the recommendations of proxy 
advisors. The relation is particularly strong for ISS. 
We checked for possible collinearity by running a 
VIF test on our variables of interest; all the 
coefficients are below 2.20, which allows us to 
exclude multicollinearity. 
 
4. DETERMINANTS OF SHAREHOLDER DISSENT 
 
4.1. Total shareholder dissent 
 
First, we analyse the determinants of shareholder 
voting on SOP. To this end, following prior studies 
on compensation-related activism (Ertimur, Ferri, & 
Muslu, 2011) and shareholder voting (Gillan and 
Starks 2000, Ertimur et al. 2011 and 2013), we run 
an OLS regression where the dependent variable is 
SOP Voting Dissent (results are robust to alternative 
regression models, such as GLM and Tobit. However, 
OLS allows for reliable statistics on explanatory 
power, and simplifies the comparison with previous 
literature). 
We test the relation between dissent and 
turnout of institutional investors at the GM: if 
shareholder dissent is mostly due to institutional 
investors, a positive relation is expected. We also 
analyse the relation of dissent with the main 
features of the remuneration policy, i.e. disclosure 
about details of the remuneration policy and the 
amount/structure of CEO remuneration. The results 
are reported in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Determinants of shareholders' dissent 
 
 
Total Shareholder 
Dissent 
Institutional 
Investors' Dissent 
Institutional 
Blockholders' Dissent 
Institutional 
Nonblockholders' 
Dissent 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Turnout Institutional Shareholders 
0.136* -0.575*** 
  
[1.783] [-2.757] 
  
Turnout Institutional Blockholders   
0.654*** 
 
  
[2.695] 
 
Turnout Institutional 
Nonblockholders 
   
-0.553** 
   
[-2.070] 
Disclosure Index 
-0.001 0.004 0.000 0.005 
[-0.275] [0.252] [-0.008] [0.350] 
Log_CEO_Total_Compensation 
-0.006 0.047** 0.007 0.044** 
[-0.769] [2.291] [0.559] [2.096] 
CEO_%_Variable_Comp 
-0.011 0.088 -0.029 0.139 
[-0.248] [0.753] [-0.399] [1.147] 
Log Total Assets 
0.012 0.084** 0.014 0.076* 
[0.910] [2.262] [0.701] [1.882] 
M/B 
0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 
[0.602] [-0.356] [0.086] [-0.519] 
ROA 
-0.058 0.38 -0.071 0.428 
[-0.622] [1.492] [-0.459] [1.644] 
RET1Y 
0.051 0.248** 0.046 0.220** 
[1.341] [2.363] [0.718] [2.027] 
SQM_RET 
-0.005 0.018 -0.004 0.027 
[-0.457] [0.627] [-0.223] [0.892] 
Cash_Flow_Rights 
-0.173*** -0.465*** -0.041 -0.387*** 
[-3.569] [-3.517] [-0.560] [-2.854] 
Remuneration_Committee 
0.009 -0.215** 0.01 -0.208** 
[0.282] [-2.503] [0.199] [-2.333] 
Financial/Nonfinancial 
-0.058 -0.111 -0.019 -0.142 
[-1.617] [-1.128] [-0.314] [-1.379] 
Constant 
0.107 -0.088 -0.077 -0.089 
[1.367] [-0.410] [-0.617] [-0.387] 
R-squared 0.185 0.219 0.067 0.199 
Observations 188 188 188 188 
The table reports the results of OLS regressions with various definitions of Shareholders' Dissent as dependent 
variable and firms characteristics as independent variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics 
are presented in parentheses. 
***, **, *, denote significance at the .01, .05, .10 level. 
 
In Model (1) the dependent variable is total 
shareholder dissent.  The turnout of institutional 
investors has the expected, positive sign, and is 
statistically significant, implying that total 
shareholder dissent is correlated with institutional 
investors exploiting SOP to engage with 
management. Both disclosure quality and CEO 
remuneration appear to have a limited impact. 
Looking at control variables, total dissent 
appears to be strongly correlated with firm 
ownership structure (Cash_Flow_Rights): dissent is 
decreasing in the CFR held by the ultimate 
shareholder, who can barely be expected to vote 
against the remuneration policy adopted by a board 
she has, substantially, appointed. An alternative, not 
mutually exclusive, the explanation could be that 
minority shareholders vote less frequently against 
the remuneration policy where the controlling 
shareholder holds a higher stake, since she may 
contribute to reducing managerial pay-related 
conflicts of interest. The explanatory power of our 
model (in terms of adjusted R2) is about 20%, i.e. 
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slightly higher than the benchmark model of Ertimur 
et al. (2013) on US data.  
Total dissent in Italy seems to be mainly 
explained by institutional investors’ turnout and 
firm ownership structure. 
 
4.2. Institutional investor dissent 
 
Institutional investors may follow a different voting 
pattern on SOP issues, both to justify their role as 
stewards of other people’s money and as a response 
to external pressures by regulators and supervisory 
authorities. Descriptive statistics showed that they 
vote against the remuneration policy more 
frequently than other shareholders (average 
institutional investor dissent is 29%, vs. 6% for total 
dissent), implying that they actually use General 
Meetings to engage with listed companies, at least 
on directors’ remuneration. 
Although institutional investors have often 
been recognised as a likely candidate for low-cost, 
corporate governance activism (Renneboog and 
Szilagyi 2011, 2013), data availability constraints 
have prevented – so far – an analysis of the votes 
they actually cast at the GM. Previous literature 
investigated activism regressing total dissent on a 
set of independent variables including proxies for 
institutional investors’ ownership (i.e. Ertimur et al., 
2011); to the best of our knowledge, no previous 
study attempted to analyze institutional investors’ 
actual voting behavior outside the US (where mutual 
funds have been required – since 2003 – to publicly 
disclose the votes cast on all shares held: Iliev & 
Lowry 2015). Given the well-known tendency of 
several institutional investors to behave passively 
(for “rational apathy” reasons: Easterbrook and 
Fischel (1996)), this aspect is key to understand the 
role they actually play in corporate governance. 
We analyse the determinants of institutional 
investors’ dissent (and its relation to PA 
recommendations) by measuring the votes they 
actually cast on SOP. As already observed, we 
calculate institutional dissent as a percentage of the 
votes cast by institutional investors alone8. The 
results are reported in Table 3, model (2). 
First, institutional investors’ dissent is 
negatively correlated with their turnout, i.e. it tends 
to decrease – on average – where the equity stake 
they collectively hold is higher. One possible 
interpretation is that where the weight of 
institutional investors is higher, the board is more 
likely to submit a remuneration policy in line with 
their expectations (possibly after negotiations 
carried out privately) and, therefore, the probability 
that they show up at the GM and vote “against” is 
lower. 
Second, institutional dissent is positively 
correlated with total CEO compensation, and also 
with past stock returns, suggesting that institutional 
investors’ dissent is, curiously, stronger in 
companies performing better. While this result may 
look puzzling, at first glance, we would argue that 
institutional investors tend to vote against a firm’s 
remuneration policy where CEO remuneration is 
comparatively “high”. This happens, typically, where 
variable compensation (cash bonuses and/or stock-
                                                          
8 Undisclosed regressions using, as a dependent variable, institutional 
investors’ dissent calculated as a percentage of total votes expressed at the 
GM obtained quite similar results. 
based compensation, which depends – in turn – on 
past stock returns) is high. In other words, 
institutional investors seem to associate higher CEO 
compensation (and stock returns) with the risk that 
compensation is excessive. Dissent is, instead, 
unrelated with disclosure quality, suggesting that 
institutions dispose of alternative information 
channels (such as PA reports) to understand a firm’s 
remuneration policy. 
Third, institutional investors pay attention to 
the governance of the remuneration policy, as 
suggested by the negative and significant 
relationship between dissent and the existence of a 
Remuneration Committee. 
Turning to control variables, institutional 
investors’ dissent, just like total dissent, is 
negatively correlated with ownership concentration: 
institutional investors tend to vote less frequently 
against the remuneration policy where the 
controlling shareholder holds a higher stake. This 
result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
institutional investors trust the controlling 
shareholder to act as a delegated monitor on 
managerial remuneration, since she may contribute 
to reducing managerial pay-related conflicts of 
interest. Dissent by institutions is also positively 
correlated with firm size (contrary to what happens 
in the US), possibly indicating a closer scrutiny by 
investors in larger firms. This is consistent with the 
structure of the Italian stock market, where 
institutional investors typically buy relatively more 
liquid blue chips, accounting for the bulk of market 
capitalization. 
 
4.3. Institutional blockholders vs. nonblockholders 
 
We repeated our analysis distinguishing between 
institutional blockholders and institutional investors 
holding smaller stakes (i.e. above or below 2% of 
equity). We expect the relation between dissent and 
explanatory variables to be stronger for the latter, 
which may have no channel other than the GM to 
show their discontent; blockholders are likely to be 
less interested in SOP since they may often negotiate 
directly with the board (or with the controlling 
shareholder). The results, reported in Table 3 
models (3) and (4), are consistent with our 
expectations.  
The results for nonblockholders confirm (and 
possibly drive) those reported for institutional 
investors in general. Their dissent is correlated with 
CEO remuneration and firm ownership structure, 
size, and stock returns. The coefficients in the 
regressions for institutional blockholders have, 
almost everywhere, the same sign as those for 
nonblockholders; however, they are almost never 
statistically significant. Contrary to what happens 
for nonblockholders, blockholders’ dissent  
depends – positively – on their turnout at the GM. A 
possible interpretation is that institutions holding 
large equity stakes, while not particularly interested 
in SOP, do, actually, go and vote against the 
remuneration policy where other engagement 
strategies have failed. On the other hand, 
nonblockholders have typically neither the force, nor 
the incentives to engage actively with management: 
consequently, the lower the equity stake they hold 
(as proxied by their turnout), the lower also the 
probability that their expectations will be taken into 
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account by the board, and, consequently, the higher 
the probability that they will vote against the 
remuneration policy. This interpretation is 
consistent with the negative sign of 
nonblockholders’ turnout at the GM. 
Interestingly, the negative relationship between 
institutional dissent and ownership concentration is 
almost entirely due to nonblockholders, suggesting 
that asset managers mostly trust control 
shareholders to act as delegated monitors on CEO 
remuneration. This result also highlights that 
different classes of minority shareholders may have 
different expectations toward control shareholders’ 
attitude to act as delegated monitors and the related 
agency problems. 
 
5. THE INFLUENCE OF PROXY ADVISORS 
 
5.1. PA reports on say on pay 
 
We analysed whether (and how) shareholders’ 
dissent is related to the recommendations issued by 
proxy advisors, and/or to the details of the analysis 
supporting such recommendations. Our data on PA 
recommendations are hand-collected from the 201 
ISS and 172 Glass Lewis (GL) reports issued for 
companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange at 
the time of the 2012 proxy season. Among the 188 
firms in our database, 183 firms are covered by ISS 
and 157 by GL.  
In 2012 ISS scrutinised compensation plans of 
Italian firms along four dimensions: fixed pay, short-
term variable pay, long-term variable pay, service 
contracts (for further details see Appendix 2). This 
investigation was followed by a summary of the 
main pros and cons of the remuneration policy. ISS 
evaluated whether the policy deviated from five 
guidelines, taking into account corporate governance 
variables, disclosure quality and remuneration 
structure. ISS assigned an explicit score to disclosure 
quality (alternatively, above average, average or 
below average) but not to remuneration structure. 
Nonetheless, issues related to compensation 
structure and long-term value creation seemingly 
were the main drivers of concern (with 103 concerns 
being issued, as shown in Table A, Appendix 2); 
insufficient disclosure of basic features of the 
remuneration policy gave rise to concerns in 81 
cases. 
Glass Lewis analysed compensation plans of 
Italian listed firms along two dimensions: disclosure 
and compensation structure (Table B, Appendix 2). 
The disclosure was analysed according to a number 
of issues, including performance metrics, targets 
and hurdles, vesting periods of stock-based 
components, other items such as severance 
agreements or equity award determination process 
and, finally, implementation of best practices (only 
for blue chips included in the FTSE-Mib Index). 
Compensation structure was analysed with regard to 
pay mix, incentive plans, severance pay and director 
pay. The main concerns related to compensation 
structure came from inadequate performance 
conditions (117 cases) and absent or insufficient 
long-term investment plans (87 companies). The 
main issues raised by GL about disclosure were 
connected with undisclosed targets and 
performance metrics (54 and 52 companies, 
respectively).  
Both PAs concluded their reports with a 
summary of the main shortcomings in the 
remuneration policy and a final voting 
recommendation. Looking at the joint distribution of 
recommendations (Table C, Appendix 2), ISS seems 
to have followed a more hard-line approach than GL. 
GL issued an “Against” recommendation for 31% (51 
out of 167) of the firms scrutinised, while ISS came 
up with a negative advice in 50% (84 out of 167) of 
the cases. Differences should not, however, be 
overemphasised. ISS and GL often issued the same 
recommendation on SOP (this happened in 59% of 
the cases). They tended to agree most when they 
issued a positive evaluation (39% of the cases). 
Within the subset of controversial cases (firms 
where at least one PA recommended to vote against), 
however, ISS and GL agreed only in 32% of the cases. 
 
5.2. PA recommendations and total dissent 
 
Following Ertimur et al. (2013), to gauge the 
influence of PA recommendations we added to our 
“benchmark model” used in Section 2 a set of 
dummy variables capturing PA recommendations 
(ISS Against, GL Against, and ISS&GL Against). Our 
results for total dissent are reported in Table 4 
(models (1) to (4)).  
Total dissent is, indeed, correlated with proxy 
advisor recommendations, but PA dummies add 
little explanatory power to the previous analysis. In 
model (1), the coefficient of ISS Against is positive at 
0.049 and statistically significant (this compares 
with 0.268 in the US: Ertimur et al 2013) and R2 is 
26.5% (65.7% in the US). Similarly, in the model (2), 
the coefficient of GL Against is positive and 
significant at 0.041 and R2 is 23.6%. The relation of 
dissent with other variables in our benchmark model 
is substantially unchanged (this is true, in particular, 
for ownership structure).  
In model (3), where we include both “ISS 
Against” and “GL Against”, R2 increases to 37.7%. 
Notably, the size of the coefficient for ISS Against in 
model (3) is comparable to that in the model (1), 
while that for GL Against is much lower than in 
model (2) and is no longer statistically significant. In 
model (4), the coefficient for the “ISS&GL Against” 
dummy is positive and statistically significant, while 
the coefficient for Only-ISS (Only-GL) is (is not) 
significant. We interpret our evidence as consistent 
with ISS having a stronger influence (ISS was the 
dominant player in the market for proxy advisory 
services) on shareholder voting in companies 
targeted by both PAs, with GL providing, 
nonetheless, additional useful information. 
To sum up, the correlation of total dissent with 
PA recommendations looks limited in Italy: for 
example, the influence of ISS on the shareholder 
vote is just around 18% of what was observed in the 
US (0.049/0.268 = 0.1828: Ertimur et al 2013). 
Furthermore, the inclusion of PA recommendations 
adds little explanatory power to the model (R2 
increases from 18.5 to 26.5% after the inclusion of 
the ISS Against dummy; R2 is around 37.7% even for 
the best-fitting model – including both the ISS and 
GL Against dummies). For the sake of comparison, in 
the US the inclusion of PA recommendations 
enhances R2 from 15% to 66% (for the ISS Against 
dummy) and to 82% (for the model including both 
dummies). 
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Table 4. Determinants of total shareholders and institutional investor dissent, by including proxy advisors' 
recommendations 
 
Total Shareholder Dissent Institutional Shareholders' Dissent 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Turnout Institutional Investors 
0.154** 0.131* 0.156*** 0.163** -0.298* -0.582*** -0.262 -0.334** 
[2.358] [1.784] [2.724] [2.128] [-1.710] [-2.837] [-1.575] [-2.124] 
ISS_Against 
0.049*** 
 
0.054*** 
 
0.378*** 
 
0.383*** 
 
[3.250] 
 
[3.790] 
 
[9.381] 
 
[9.223] 
 
GL_Against  
0.041** 0.014 
  
0.244*** 0.192*** 
 
 
[2.158] [0.897] 
  
[4.555] [4.316] 
 
ISS&GL_Against    
0.067*** 
   
0.591*** 
   
[2.670] 
   
[11.417] 
Only_ISS    
0.038* 
   
0.292*** 
   
[1.859] 
   
[7.013] 
Only_GL    
0.031 
   
0.058 
   
[1.042] 
   
[0.952] 
Disclosure Index 
-0.002 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.026* 0.014 0.008 
[-0.446] [1.126] [0.618] [0.112] [0.167] [1.697] [1.120] [0.708] 
Log_CEO_Total_Compensation 
-0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 0.027 0.039* 0.01 0.022 
[-1.217] [-0.766] [-1.448] [-1.201] [1.625] [1.712] [0.565] [1.412] 
CEO_%_Variable_Comp 
-0.013 -0.018 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 0.161 0.094 0.031 
[-0.356] [-0.421] [-0.489] [-0.354] [-0.178] [1.317] [0.975] [0.346] 
Log Total Assets 
0.016 0.02 0.028** 0.007 0.055* 0.059 0.03 0.039 
[1.356] [1.360] [2.543] [0.496] [1.762] [1.458] [0.927] [1.404] 
M/B 
0.003 0 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 
[1.121] [-0.093] [0.247] [0.635] [0.360] [-0.259] [0.271] [-0.301] 
ROA 
-0.112 0.04 0.034 -0.091 0.211 0.008 -0.006 0.168 
[-1.418] [0.340] [0.387] [-0.982] [1.001] [0.026] [-0.023] [0.877] 
RET1Y 
0.04 0.092** 0.066* 0.043 0.171* 0.205* 0.02 0.168** 
[1.246] [2.106] [1.929] [1.136] [1.969] [1.678] [0.206] [2.141] 
SQM_RET 
-0.005 -0.001 0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.017 -0.035 -0.002 
[-0.562] [-0.050] [0.184] [-0.615] [-0.054] [-0.504] [-1.279] [-0.105] 
Cash_Flow_Rights 
-0.134*** -0.110** -0.067* -0.154*** -0.304*** -0.457*** -0.306*** -0.317*** 
[-3.259] [-2.198] [-1.724] [-3.189] [-2.754] [-3.260] [-2.716] [-3.183] 
Remuneration_Committee 
0.022 -0.021 -0.017 0.027 -0.069 -0.243** -0.12 -0.032 
[0.808] [-0.621] [-0.643] [0.847] [-0.938] [-2.588] [-1.544] [-0.494] 
Financial/Nonfinancial 
-0.049 -0.047 -0.046* -0.039 -0.004 -0.066 0.029 0.024 
[-1.618] [-1.352] [-1.699] [-1.090] [-0.049] [-0.675] [0.375] [0.327] 
Constant 
0.041 0.029 -0.056 0.103 -0.181 0.037 0.025 -0.109 
[0.611] [0.325] [-0.824] [1.327] [-1.017] [0.150] [0.127] [-0.680] 
R-squared 0.265 0.236 0.377 0.22 0.486 0.32 0.586 0.577 
Observations 183 157 152 188 183 157 152 188 
The table reports the results of OLS regressions with Total Shareholder and Institutional Shareholders' Dissent 
as the dependent variable and ISS and/or GL "Against" recommendation and firms characteristics as independent 
variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  
***, **, *, † denote significance at the .001, .01, .05, .10 level. 
 
5.3. PA recommendations and institutional  
investor dissent 
 
We expect institutional shareholder votes also to be 
associated with PA recommendations; the 
association should be stronger than for the average 
shareholder, since institutional investors are known 
to buy PA reports on a regular basis and have a 
strong incentive to outsource research and analysis 
activities (Choi et al., 2009; Ertimur et al., 2013), 
particularly for companies where they hold small 
equity stakes. To analyse the relation of PA 
recommendations with institutional investor voting, 
we follow the same research strategy implemented 
for total dissent. Our results are reported in Table 4 
(models (5) to (8)). 
Consistent with our expectations, votes of 
institutional investors on SOP are strongly correlated 
with PA recommendations. The coefficients for the 
dummies capturing PA recommendations are 
positive and much higher than those for total 
dissent. In model (5) ISS Against is positive at 0.378 
(i.e. more than 8 times the coefficient in the 
regression for total dissent) and R2 is as high as 49% 
(i.e. almost twice the value in the regression for total 
dissent). Similarly, in the model (6), the coefficient of 
GL Against is positive at 0.244 and statistically 
significant (it is almost 6 times the coefficient in the 
regression for total dissent). Even in a country where 
ownership is concentrated and, therefore, the voting 
outcome is often known in advance, institutional 
investors are active on SOP issues, and their voting 
decisions are strongly correlated with PA 
recommendations. This feature remains hidden from 
view, when looking only at total dissent, since this 
measure is overwhelmingly affected by the votes 
cast by other categories of shareholders, holding 
larger equity stakes. 
Results are substantially confirmed in models 
(7) and (8), where both ISS Against and GL Against 
and/or an ISS&GL Against dummy are included. The 
correlation of institutional investors’ votes with PA 
recommendations is, once again, stronger for ISS, as 
shown by the relative size of the regression 
coefficients; ISS is apparently followed by most 
institutional investors when PAs provide divergent 
recommendations. However, GL is far from 
irrelevant, even after taking into account the effects 
of ISS recommendations. This may be connected to 
two, not mutually exclusive factors: on one hand, 
some firms are targeted only by ISS or GL, creating 
an obvious channel of exclusive influence. On the 
other hand, dissent is much stronger where both 
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PAs recommend voting Against, implying that even 
investors normally relying on ISS consider the 
release of a negative report by GL as an additional 
relevant piece of information. The inclusion of PA 
recommendations adds great explanatory power to 
our model (R2 is around 58%, comparable to the 
results of Ertimur et al. (2013) for total dissent in 
the US). 
As already observed in previous literature (Choi 
et al. 2009), it is difficult to say whether the 
association between PA recommendations and 
shareholder votes is due to a causal relationship or 
simply to investors and PAs considering the same 
factors when taking their decisions (i.e. voting and 
recommending for or against, respectively). Actually, 
these explanations are not mutually exclusive, since 
different categories of shareholders may follow 
different voting strategies. 
 
5.4. PA recommendations and institutional 
blockholders’ vs. nonblockholders’ vote 
 
We repeated our analysis distinguishing between 
institutional blockholders and nonblockholders. We 
expect the relation to be stronger for the latter since 
the sensitivity to PA recommendations depends on 
the incentives of institutional investors to gather 
and process information independently, which in 
turn have been proved to depend on the size of their 
holdings (Agrawal & Nasser, 2012; Cronqvist & 
Fahlenbrach, 2009). Furthermore, nonblockholders 
are often internationally diversified asset managers 
(mutual or pension funds), having little incentive to 
bear the costs implied by analyzing thousands of 
companies in their portfolios; this is especially true 
in the case of Italian firms, only a tiny minority of 
which may be considered sufficiently large to justify 
the investment in independent analysis. Our results 
are reported in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Determinants of blockholders and nonblockholders institutional investors' dissent, by including 
proxy advisors' recommendations 
 
 
Institutional Blockholders' Dissent Institutional Nonblockholders' Dissent 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Turnout Institutional Blockholders 
0.725*** 0.660** 0.720** 0.738*** 
    
[2.962] [2.393] [2.565] [3.115] 
    
Turnout  Institutional Nonblockholders     
-0.211 -0.643** -0.195 -0.301 
    
[-1.012] [-2.412] [-0.980] [-1.540] 
ISS_Against 
0.073** 
 
0.061* 
 
0.426*** 
 
0.446*** 
 
[2.494] 
 
[1.727] 
 
[10.915] 
 
[11.126] 
 
GL_Against  
0.076** 0.075* 
  
0.245*** 0.168*** 
 
 
[2.085] [1.929] 
  
[4.359] [3.879] 
 
ISS&GL_Against    
0.143*** 
   
0.621*** 
   
[3.480] 
   
[11.987] 
Only_ISS    
0.036 
   
0.357*** 
   
[1.106] 
   
[8.546] 
Only_GL    
-0.007 
   
0.109* 
   
[-0.144] 
   
[1.771] 
Disclosure Index 
0 0.006 0.005 0 0.003 0.030* 0.013 0.012 
[-0.009] [0.578] [0.490] [0.043] [0.268] [1.794] [1.023] [1.117] 
Log_CEO_Total_Compensation 
0.003 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.023 0.037 0.002 0.017 
[0.270] [0.537] [0.271] [0.170] [1.374] [1.538] [0.129] [1.085] 
CEO_%_Variable_Comp 
-0.05 -0.015 -0.029 -0.032 0.013 0.197 0.115 0.055 
[-0.693] [-0.175] [-0.340] [-0.450] [0.140] [1.543] [1.226] [0.622] 
Log Total Assets 
0.013 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.043 0.053 0.021 0.029 
[0.616] [0.365] [0.275] [0.362] [1.380] [1.211] [0.647] [0.997] 
M/B 
0.002 0 0 0 0.002 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 
[0.337] [-0.069] [0.057] [0.011] [0.302] [-0.440] [0.196] [-0.323] 
ROA 
-0.095 -0.191 -0.184 -0.107 0.252 0.093 0.109 0.216 
[-0.612] [-0.868] [-0.823] [-0.706] [1.248] [0.275] [0.441] [1.138] 
RET1Y 
0.032 0.065 0.038 0.028 0.140* 0.2 -0.01 0.140* 
[0.500] [0.774] [0.441] [0.455] [1.667] [1.562] [-0.107] [1.789] 
SQM_RET 
-0.008 -0.002 -0.005 -0.008 0.006 -0.002 -0.02 0.006 
[-0.438] [-0.083] [-0.234] [-0.458] [0.261] [-0.067] [-0.769] [0.263] 
Cash_Flow_Rights 
-0.027 -0.007 -0.001 -0.023 -0.206* -0.397*** -0.209* -0.239** 
[-0.360] [-0.085] [-0.007] [-0.315] [-1.935] [-2.712] [-1.930] [-2.420] 
Remuneration_Committee 
0.042 0.028 0.057 0.051 -0.038 -0.238** -0.089 -0.009 
[0.759] [0.430] [0.828] [0.971] [-0.520] [-2.411] [-1.174] [-0.138] 
Financial/Nonfinancial 
-0.002 -0.003 0.012 0.004 -0.012 -0.098 0.022 0.02 
[-0.025] [-0.044] [0.172] [0.064] [-0.146] [-0.952] [0.289] [0.266] 
Constant 
-0.112 -0.124 -0.144 -0.084 -0.201 0.031 0.018 -0.13 
[-0.892] [-0.763] [-0.869] [-0.688] [-1.124] [0.117] [0.090] [-0.782] 
R-squared 0.101 0.084 0.108 0.136 0.531 0.279 0.623 0.592 
Observations 183 157 152 188 183 157 152 188 
Tables report the results of OLS regressions with Small Institutional Shareholders and Institutional Blockholders' 
Dissent as the dependent variable and ISS and/or GL "Against" recommendation and firms characteristics as 
independent variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  
***, **, * denote significance at the .01, .05, .10 level. 
 
Actually, the results for institutional investors 
as a whole seem to be driven by nonblockholders, 
while institutional blockholders, having a stronger 
incentive to perform their own research, appear to 
be less sensitive to PA recommendations (see 
models (1) to (4)). Consistently with our 
expectations, the relation of dissent with PA 
recommendations is always stronger for 
nonblockholders. In model (5) the coefficient for the 
“ISS Against” dummy is positive at 0.426, and R2 is 
as high as 53.1%. In model (6) “GL Against” is also 
significant, although the regression has a lower R2; 
ISS&GL (jointly) Against shows also a strong, 
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significant additional effect in the model (8), which 
has an R2 equal to 59%.  
While it is difficult to estimate whether PA 
recommendations have actually an impact in Italy, it 
is reasonable to assume that at least part of the 
association is causal. Following Ertimur et al. (2013), 
it is possible to estimate the effect of the causal 
relationship, assuming that (1) blockholders vote 
independently of ISS recommendations, while only 
some of the institutions holding smaller stakes do 
so; and (2) institutions performing their own 
research reach on average the same conclusions. Our 
results suggest that about 7.3% of investors doing 
their own research will vote Against when ISS also 
recommends Against. Consequently, at least about 
35.3% of the institutional nonblockholders 
(42.6%−7.3%) simply follow ISS recommendations, 
providing a lower-bound estimate of the causal 
effect of ISS. If instead, institutions holding smaller 
stakes simply follow ISS, 42.6% may be considered 
an upper-bound estimate of ISS’s causal influence. 
Both the lower and upper bound estimates of the 
causal impact are higher than those found by 
Ertimur et al. (2013) on US data (35.3% and 42.6% 
versus 10% and 34.4% in the US). Therefore, the 
effect of PAs on institutional investors’ voting in 
Italy appears to be at least as strong as (and 
probably stronger than) that observed in the US. 
This makes perfect sense since nonblockholders are 
often foreign (mostly US-based) mutual and pension 
funds, for which relying on PA reports might be a 
cost-effective way to decide on SOP issues in Italian, 
mostly small- or mid-cap companies. 
 
5.5. The influence of individual concerns 
 
We finally investigate whether the sensitivity of 
institutional investors’ votes to PA 
recommendations varies with the rationale for the 
recommendation. To this end, we substitute the 
coefficients of ISS and GL Against with variables 
capturing the number and type of concerns 
identified in the PA reports. Results are reported in 
Table 6 (the results for institutional 
nonblockholders (not reported) are quite similar to 
those reported in the text; in untabulated tests, we 
obtain that institutional blockholders are 
substantially insensitive to the contents of PA 
reports). 
 
Table 6. Institutional dissent and specific concerns in proxy advisors' recommendations 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Turnout Institutional Investors 
-0.309* -0.530*** -0.610*** -0.592*** 
[-1.760] [-2.772] [-2.818] [-2.736] 
Single concern 
0.388*** 
 
0.109 
 
[5.689] 
 
[1.631] 
 
Multiple concerns 
0.368*** 
 
0.185*** 
 
[8.810] 
 
[2.632] 
 
ISS: RR was NOT made available in a timely manner  
-0.176 
  
 
[-0.565] 
  
ISS: Basic features of compensation policy NOT disclosed  
0.023 
  
 
[0.517] 
  
ISS: Compensation Committee includes executives  
0.168** 
  
 
[2.411] 
  
ISS: Concerns exist on compensation structure and LT 
value creation 
 
0.152*** 
  
 
[3.453] 
  
ISS: Severance payments exceed 24 months' pay  
0.310*** 
  
 
[5.157] 
  
GL concern structure    
0.061** 
   
[2.094] 
GL concern disclosure    
0.023 
   
[0.762] 
Disclosure Index 
0.002 -0.002 0.017 0.009 
[0.196] [-0.118] [1.031] [0.553]    
Log_CEO_Total_Compensation 
0.028* 0.037* 0.044* 0.039 
[1.670] [1.871] [1.844] [1.605]    
CEO_%_Variable_Comp 
-0.002 0.024 0.126 0.098 
[-0.017] [0.221] [0.987] [0.762]    
Log Total Assets 
0.056* 0.065* 0.019 0.029 
[1.783] [1.871] [0.423] [0.649]    
M/B 
0.002 -0.003 0 0.002 
[0.368] [-0.460] [0.030] [0.187]    
ROA 
0.209 0.459* -0.1 -0.036 
[0.984] [1.919] [-0.287] [-0.104]    
RET1Y 
0.186** 0.192** 0.220* 0.187 
[2.120] [1.979] [1.719] [1.442]    
SQM_RET 
-0.001 0.004 -0.013 -0.018 
[-0.057] [0.144] [-0.379] [-0.500]    
Cash_Flow_Rights 
-0.298*** -0.300** -0.462*** -0.444*** 
[-2.679] [-2.401] [-3.142] [-2.952]    
Remuneration_Committee 
-0.071 -0.156* -0.249** -0.258**  
[-0.952] [-1.903] [-2.498] [-2.607]    
Financial/Nonfinancial 
-0.006 0 -0.042 -0.087 
[-0.069] [0.000] [-0.402] [-0.841]    
Constant 
-0.189 -0.183 0.312 0.255 
[-1.053] [-0.877] [1.152] [0.957]    
R-squared 0.482 0.389 0.261 0.252 
Observations 183 183 157 157 
The table reports the results of OLS regressions with Institutional Blockholders' Dissent as the dependent 
variable and ISS and/or GL concerns and firms characteristics as independent variables. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix. The t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  
***, **, * denote significance at the .01, .05, .10 level. 
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In models (1) and (3) institutional shareholders’ 
votes are regressed against dummy variables taking 
value 1 where Proxy Advisors express one single 
concern (or, respectively, multiple concerns)9, and 0 
otherwise. Model (1) shows that coefficients on 
Single concern and Multiple concerns are both 
positive and significant, thus suggesting that 
institutional investors are more likely to vote against 
a firm’s remuneration policy when ISS expresses any 
reason for concern. The non-significant difference 
between the two coefficients implies that, differently 
from what happens in the US, dissent is not related 
to the number of ISS concerns. 
On the other hand, model (3) shows that, in the 
case of GL, the coefficient for “single concern” has 
the correct (positive) sign but is not statistically 
significant; only the presence of “multiple concerns” 
seems to increase significantly the probability of 
institutional investors voting against the 
remuneration policy. 
In model (2) we introduce variables capturing 
the quality of ISS concerns; to this end, we use a set 
of 5 dummy variables, each taking value one if one 
of the 5 possible, specific reasons for concern about 
the firm’s remuneration policy is formulated in the 
“Analysis” subsection of the ISS report. Model (2) 
shows that institutional investors, while apparently 
following PA advice, apparently look through the 
final recommendation (vote “for” or “against”) at the 
specific reasons for concern underlined in the 
reports. First, they seem to care for governance 
issues, as suggested by the higher dissent associated 
with the ISS’s concern related to the presence of 
executives in the remuneration committee. Another 
point institutional investors seem to care for is the 
structure and long-term value creation of the 
proposed remuneration policy (the coefficient is 
here positive (0.15) and statistically significant). 
Even more relevant in driving investors’ dissent is 
the inclusion of provisions allowing the board to 
attribute “excessive” severance pay (i.e. higher than 
24 months’ remuneration) to leaving managers: the 
coefficient is here 0.310 and significant at the 1% 
level (it is actually twice as high as the coefficient for 
concerns about the structure of the remuneration 
policy (0.310 / 0.152 = 2.04).  
Other reasons of concern identified by proxy 
advisors, such as the score on disclosure quality 
(taking into account apparently important features 
such as performance criteria, caps, and severance 
payments), or the timeliness of publication of the 
Remuneration Report do not seem to affect 
institutional shareholders’ decisions. 
Model (4) repeats the analysis for the quality of 
GL concerns, distinguishing between disclosure 
issues, on one hand, and structure of the 
remuneration policy, on the other. The positive and 
significant relationship between shareholders’ 
dissent and concerns related to the structure of the 
compensation policy is confirmed also for GL, while 
concerns about disclosure seem to play here a 
marginal role. 
To sum up, although institutional investors 
often follow the suggestion of Proxy Advisors to 
                                                          
9 Model (1) considers both a “single concern” and a “multiple concern” 
dummy, i.e. compares such situations with cases where no concern is 
expressed. 
vote for or against a firm’s remuneration policy, they 
seem to look through the final recommendations, at 
the specific reasons for concern identified in PA 
reports. The quality of PA comments seems more 
important than the sheer number of “concerns”. 
Severance pay provisions possibly generating 
payments deemed “excessive” according to the 
standard conventionally adopted by PAs (24 months’ 
pay) are – by far – the most relevant reason for 
concern for institutional investors. Moreover, 
institutional investors are apparently interested in 
the governance and the structure of the 
remuneration policy, while other reasons of concern 
raised by proxy advisors, such as the disclosure 
quality or the timeliness of publication of the 
Remuneration Report, are less relevant in driving 
institutional investors’ dissent at GM.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Institutional investors are often criticised for their 
insufficient engagement with listed companies. To 
be sure, information and other transaction costs 
limit their capacity to actively monitor investee 
firms and to engage with their management. The 
incentives to remain passive (rational apathy) are 
arguably more relevant where a controlling 
shareholder is present, and where investors hold 
only a small stake in equity capital. A partial 
solution to this problem is offered by Proxy 
Advisors (PAs), providing proxy voting services on a 
subscription basis. We use the introduction of Say-
On-Pay (SOP) legislation in Italy as a natural 
experiment to investigate shareholder engagement 
and the role of proxy advisors in a context 
characterised by concentrated ownership. Making 
use of a unique dataset, we analyse the behaviour of 
different classes of shareholders (in particular, 
institutional investors) and its relation to PA 
recommendations. Capitalising on the peculiar 
features of Italian regulation, we are able to track 
the votes actually cast by institutional investors, 
thereby filling a gap in the existing literature on 
activism and SOP voting.  
Our results show that while total shareholder 
dissent is rather low, in line with what happens in 
other developed countries, dissent by institutional 
investors is surprisingly high: average dissent 
among institutional investors was around 29% 
versus an average total dissent equal to 6%. Average 
dissent increases further to 32% amongst 
institutional nonblockholders (typically, 
internationally diversified mutual and pension 
funds). Institutional investors are the most likely 
candidate to engage actively on a firm’s 
remuneration policy (their turnout is positively 
related to total dissent).  
Blockholders and nonblockholders seem to 
follow a different behavioural model when they have 
concerns about a firm’s remuneration policy. The 
former have the possibility to engage with 
management “behind the scenes”: if the board 
cooperates, blockholders do not need to show up at 
the GM, since the vote of the controlling shareholder 
will be sufficient to guarantee approval of the agreed 
upon remuneration policy. Consequently, they 
participate to the GM mostly in the opposite case, 
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i.e. where management is insensitive to outside 
pressure, i.e. they typically show up at the GM to 
vote “no” (dissent is positively related to turnout). 
The same is not true for nonblockholders, whose 
capacity to engage with management is not only 
limited but also decreasing, the smaller the stake 
they hold: consequently, nonblockholders’ dissent is 
negatively related to turnout. Institutional investors 
are comparatively more likely to dissent when they 
have concerns about some aspect of managerial 
remuneration (e.g. when CEO remuneration is 
“high”) or about the governance of the remuneration 
setting process (e.g. when a remuneration committee 
has not been appointed). 
Both total and institutional dissent are strongly 
related with firm ownership structure: in particular, 
they are negatively correlated with the stake held by 
the controlling shareholder. While this result could 
be considered trivial for total dissent (control 
shareholders almost always vote in favour of the 
remuneration policy proposed by the board), it was 
far from obvious for institutional investors. Actually, 
institutional investors vote less frequently against 
the remuneration policy, the larger the stake held by 
the controlling shareholder. This result is consistent 
with institutional investors trusting control 
shareholders to act as delegated monitors toward 
the CEO, thereby generating shared benefits of 
control. 
Our findings also show that the vote of 
institutional investors is strongly correlated with PA 
recommendations. The role of proxy advisors 
appears of greater consequence for nonblockholders 
(mostly internationally diversified asset managers), 
while institutional blockholders, having a stronger 
incentive to perform their own research, appear to 
be less sensitive to PA recommendations. While it is 
difficult to estimate the exact causal effect of PA 
recommendations, we estimate that the influence of 
PAs on institutional investors’ voting in Italy is at 
least as strong as (and possibly stronger than) that 
observed in the US. This is consistent with the 
weight of non-domestic institutions (which can be 
hardly expected to independently analyse thousands 
of firms in their portfolios); and it is especially so in 
Italy, where most listed firms may be classified as 
small/medium cap firms on a comparative basis. 
Institutional investors, however, do not follow 
PA recommendations blindly; on the opposite, their 
decisions are affected by the specific reasons of 
concern expressed by proxy advisors, especially 
about the governance and the structure of the 
remuneration policy. Severance pay has, by far, the 
largest impact on the voting decisions of 
institutional investors. 
Our results have potential implications for a 
number of policy issues currently debated both at 
the EU level and in the individual Member States. 
First, we detect a considerable amount of investor 
“activism” on remuneration issues, especially by 
nonblockholders. While this activism is not 
immediately apparent (general shareholder dissent 
is “low”), our results are at odds with conventional 
wisdom stating that shareholder engagement is 
“insufficient” or “suboptimal”, particularly after one 
takes into account the fact that: a) dissenting on a 
particular item in the GM agenda underestimates 
activism, most of which takes place “behind closed 
doors”; b) value judgments should take into account 
the implied costs as well as benefits.  
Second, in principle the case for Say-on-Pay is 
not straightforward in a context of concentrated 
ownership, for a number of reasons: a) a controlling 
shareholder does not need a vote to influence board 
decisions, since she could easily replace 
uncooperative board members; b) outside 
shareholders have no simple way to block approval 
of a “bad” policy; c) since majority approval is 
almost certain, outside investors have little incentive 
to get active in the first place. Our results show, 
however, that institutional investors holding small 
equity stakes perceived Say-on-Pay as a low-cost 
opportunity to send signals to management. In other 
words, we show that SOP is potentially useful also 
under apparently unfavourable conditions 
(concentrated ownership). Further research is 
needed to perform a comprehensive cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Third, Proxy Advisors seem to perform an 
efficient role as information intermediaries 
providing a potentially cost-effective service to 
investors. At the same time, their ideal customers 
(i.e. the institutional nonblockholders) do not take 
PA recommendations at face value but are seemingly 
able to “look through” such recommendations (vote 
“for” or “against” the firm’s remuneration policy) 
and to discern the relevant information content in 
PA reports. 
Due to limitations in data availability, our 
analysis is just a first step toward a deeper 
understanding of institutional shareholders activism 
and the role of proxy advisors. Suggestions for 
future research include extending the analysis to: a) 
shareholder voting on other items in the GM agenda; 
b) a multi-year time frame, in order to see if 
shareholder decisions are stable over time and/or 
are influenced by changes in the institutional setting 
(and, possibly, in the methodological approach by 
proxy advisors); c) a cross-country comparison. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Agrawal, A. & Nasser, T. (2012). Blockholders on 
boards and CEO compensation, turnover and firm 
valuation. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ 
ssrn.1443431 
2. Alexander, C. R., Chen, M. A., Seppi, D. J. & Spatt, 
C. S. (2010). Interim news and the role of proxy 
voting advice. Review of Financial Studies, 23(12), 
4419-4454.  
3. Alissa, W. (2015). Boards’ response to 
shareholders’ dissatisfaction: the case of 
shareholders’ say on pay in the UK. European 
Accounting Review, 24(4), 1-26. doi:10.1080/ 
09638180.2015.1058719 
4. Armour, J. (2008). Enforcement strategies in UK 
corporate governance: A roadmap and empirical 
assessment. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ 
ssrn.1133542 
5. Balsam, S., Boone, J., Liu, H. & Yin, J. (2016). The 
impact of say-on-pay on executive compensation. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 35(2), 162-
191.  
6. Bebchuk, L. A. (2005). The case for increasing 
shareholder power. Harvard Law Review, 118(3), 
833-914.  
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 14, Issue 4, Summer 2017 
 
55 
7. Becht, M., Franks, J. R. & Grant, J. (2010). Hedge 
fund activism in Europe. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1616340 
8. Becht, M., Franks, J. R., Mayer, C. & Rossi, S. (2009). 
Returns to shareholder activism: Evidence from a 
clinical study of the Hermes UK focus fund. 
Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), 3093-3129. 
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn054 
9. Belcredi, M., Bozzi, S., Ciavarella, A. & Novembre, 
V. (2014). Say-on-pay in a context of concentrated 
ownership. Evidence from Italy. CONSOB Working 
Papers. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ 
ssrn.2402886 
10. Black, B. S. (1998). Shareholder activism and 
corporate governance in the United States. The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law, 3, 459-465.  
11. Bradley, M., Brav, A., Goldstein, I. & Jiang, W. 
(2009). Activist arbitrage. A study of open-ending 
attempts of closed-end funds. Journal of financial 
economics, 95(1), 1-19. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2009. 
01.005 
12. Brav, A., Jiang, W., Partnoy, F. & Thomas, R. (2007). 
Hedge fund activism, corporate governance, and 
firm performance. Journal of Finance, 63(4), 1729-
1775. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01373.x 
13. Buchanan, B. G., Netter, J. M., Poulsen, A. B. & 
Yang, T. (2012). Shareholder proposal rules and 
practice: Evidence from a comparison of the 
United States and United Kingdom. American 
Business Law Journal, 49(4), 739-803. doi:10.1111/ 
j.1744-1714.2012.01141.x 
14. Burkart, M., Gromb, D. & Panunzi, F. (1997). Large 
shareholders, monitoring, and the value of the 
firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3), 693-
728.  
15. Burkart, M., Panunzi, F. & Shleifer, A. (2003). 
Family Firms. The Journal of Finance, 58(5), 2167-
2201.  
16. Cai, J. & Walkling, R. (2011). Shareholders’ say on 
pay: Does it create value. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 46(2), 299-339.  
17. Carleton, W. T., Nelson, J. M. & Weisbach, M. S. 
(1998). The influence of institutions on corporate 
governance through private negotiations: Evidence 
from TIAA-CREF. The Journal of Finance, 53(4), 
1335-1362.  
18. Carter, M. E. & Zamora, V. L. (2007). Shareholder 
remuneration votes and CEO compensation 
design. SSRN Electronic Journal.  doi:10.2139/ 
ssrn.1004061 
19. Celik, S. & Isakkson, a. (2013). Institutional 
investors and ownership engagement OECD 
Journal: Financial Market Trends. doi:10.1787/ 
19952872 
20. Choi, S., Fisch, J. & Kahan, M. (2009). The power of 
proxy advisors: Myth or reality. Emory Law 
Journal, 59, 869-918.  
21. CONSOB. (2016). Report on corporate governance 
of Italian listed companies, 1-47.  
22. Conyon, M. J. (2016). Shareholder dissent on say-
on-pay and CEO compensation. SSRN Electronic 
Journal.  doi:10.2139/ssrn.2748645 
23. Conyon, M. J. & Sadler, G. (2010). Shareholder 
voting and directors' remuneration report 
legislation: Say on pay in the UK. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 18(4), 296-
312. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00802.x 
24. Cronqvist, H. & Fahlenbrach, R. (2009). Large 
shareholders and corporate policies. Review of 
Financial Studies, 22(10), 3941-3976. doi:10.1093/ 
rfs/hhn093 
25. Cziraki, P., Renneboog, L. & Szilagyi, P. G. (2010). 
Shareholder activism through proxy proposals: 
The European perspective. European Financial 
Management, 16(5), 738-777. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
036X.2010.00559.x 
26. de Jong, A., DeJong, D. V., Mertens, G. & Wasley, C. 
E. (2005). The role of self-regulation in corporate 
governance: evidence and implications from the 
Netherlands. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(3), 
473-503. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2004.01.002 
27. Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. & 
Shleifer, A. (2008). The law and economics of self-
dealing. Journal of financial economics, 88, 430-
465. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.02.007 
28. Easterbrook, F. H. & Fischel, D. R. (1996). The 
economic structure of corporate law: Harvard 
University Press. 
29. Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F. & Muslu, V. (2011). 
Shareholder activism and CEO pay. Review of 
Financial Studies, 24(2), 535-592. 
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq113 
30. Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F. & Oesch, D. (2013). 
Shareholder votes and proxy advisors: Evidence 
from say on pay. Journal of Accounting Research, 
51(5), 951-996.  
31. Eulerich, M., Rapp, M. S. & Wolff, M. (2012). 
Augewaehlte Aspekte del Vorstandsverguetung: 
Say-on-Pay-Abstimmungen im Rahmen der 
Hauptversammlung-Ergebnisse einer empirischen 
Analyse der HV-Saison 2010. HHL Research Paper 
Series in Corporate Governance, 7, SSRN Electronic 
Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1998813 
32. European Commission. (2006). Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the 
exercise of voting rights by shareholders of 
companies having their registered office in a 
Member State and whose shares are admitted to 
trading on a regulated market and amending 
Directive 2004/109/EC (COM(2005) 685), 1-257.  
33. Faghani, M., Monem, R. & Ng, C. (2015). ‘Say on 
pay’ regulation and chief executive officer pay: 
Evidence from Australia. Corporate Ownership and 
Control, 12(3), 28-39.  
34. Ferri, F. & Maber, D. A. (2013). Say on pay votes 
and CEO compensation: Evidence from the UK. 
Review of Finance, 17(2), 527-563. doi:10.1093/ 
rof/rfs003 
35. Gillan, S. L. & Starks, L. T. (2000). Corporate 
governance proposals and shareholder activism: 
The role of institutional investors. Journal of 
financial economics, 57(2), 275-305. doi:10.1016/ 
S0304-405X(00)00058-1 
36. Gillan, S. L. & Starks, L. T. (2007). The evolution of 
shareholder activism in the United States. Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance, 19, 55-73.  
37. Greenwood, R. & Schor, M. (2009). Investor 
activism and takeovers. Journal of financial 
economics, 92(3), 362-375. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco. 
2008.05.005 
38. Grossman, S. J. & Hart, O. D. (1980). Takeover bids, 
the free-rider problem, and the theory of the 
corporation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 11(1), 
42. doi:10.2307/3003400 
39. Hewitt, P. (2011). The exercise of shareholder 
rights. OECD Corporate Governance Working 
Papers, 3. doi:10.1787/5kg54d0l1lvf-en 
40. Hitz, J.-M. & Lehmann, N. (2017). Empirical 
evidence on the role of proxy advisors in European 
capital markets. European Accounting Review, doi: 
10.1080/09638180.2017.1305282. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 14, Issue 4, Summer 2017 
 
56 
41. Iliev, P. & Lowry, M. (2015). Are mutual funds 
active voters? Review of Financial Studies, 28(2), 
446-485. 
42. Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the 
firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of financial 
economics, 3(4), 305-360.  
43. John, K. & Klein, A. (1995). Shareholder proposals 
and corporate governance. SSRN Electronic 
Journal.  
44. Karpoff, J. M. (2001). The impact of shareholder 
activism on target companies: A survey of 
empirical findings. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.885365 
45. Karpoff, J. M., Malatesta, P. H. & Walkling, R. A. 
(1996). Corporate governance and shareholder 
initiatives: Empirical evidence. Journal of financial 
economics, 42(3), 365-395.  
46. Kimbro, M. B. & Xu, D. (2016). Shareholders have a 
say in executive compensation: Evidence from say-
on-pay in the United States. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, 35(1), 19-42. doi:10.1016/ 
j.jaccpubpol.2015.08.003 
47. La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & 
Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of 
Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155. doi:10.1086/ 
250042 
48. Larcker, D. F., McCall, A. L. & Ormazabal, G. (2013). 
Proxy advisory firms and stock option repricing. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 56(2), 149-
169.  
49. Masouros, P. E. (2010). Is the EU taking 
shareholder rights seriously? An essay on the 
impotence of shareholdership in corporate 
Europe. European Company Law, 7, 195-203.  
50. Ong, S.-E., Petrova, M. & Spieler, A. C. (2010). 
Shareholder activism and director retirement 
plans repeals. Corporate Ownership and Control, 
7(3), 193-209.  
51. Powell, D. & Rapp, M. S. (2015). Non-mandatory say 
on pay votes and AGM participation: Evidence 
from Germany. SAFE Working Paper No.125. SSRN 
Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2613406 
52. Renneboog, L. & Szilagyi, P. (2013). Shareholder 
engagement at European general meetings. Boards 
and Shareholders in European Listed Companies, 
315-364.  
53. Renneboog, L. & Szilagyi, P. G. (2011). The role of 
shareholder proposals in corporate governance. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(1), 167-188. 
doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.10.002 
54. Rho, H.-K. (2007). On defining shareholder 
activism: Exploring the terrain for research. 
Corporate Ownership and Control, 4(2), 304-311.  
55. Schwarcz-Ziv, M. & Wermers, R. (2015). Which 
shareholders benefit from low-cost monitoring 
opportunities? Evidence from say on pay. SSRN 
Electronic Journal.  
56. Smith, M. P. (1996). Shareholder activism by 
institutional investors: Evidence from CalPERS. 
The Journal of Finance, 51(1), 227-252.  
57. Thomas, R. S. & Cotter, J. F. (2007). Shareholder 
proposals in the new millennium: Shareholder 
support, board response, and market reaction. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(2), 368-391.  
58. Troeger, T. H. & Walz, U. (2016). Does say on pay 
matter? Evidence from the German natural 
experiment. SAFE Working Paper No.125. SSRN 
Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2723792 
59. Villalonga, B. & Amit, R. (2006). How do family 
ownership, control and management affect firm 
value? Journal of financial economics, 80(2), 385-
417. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.005 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Variable definitions 
Turnout and Voting: 
 The turnout of institutional shareholders (%): 
percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional 
investors attending the 2012 GM. Institutional 
shareholders are defined according to Consob 
(2014): a) asset managers and pension funds (i.e. 
passive funds), b) sovereign, hedge and private 
equity funds (i.e. active funds), c) banks, d) 
insurance companies. Shareholders are classified as 
blockholders or nonblockholders according to 
whether they hold more or less than 2% of the firm’s 
equity capital 
 Total Shareholder Dissent (%): percentage of 
ordinary shares voting against (or abstaining on) 
Section 1 of the Remuneration Report at the 2012 
GM 
 Dissent of institutional shareholders (%): 
percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional 
shareholders voting against (or abstaining on) 
Section 1 of the Remuneration Report at the 2012 
GM.  
 Dissent of institutional blockholders (%): 
percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional 
blockholders voting against (or abstaining on) 
Section 1 of the Remuneration Report at the 2012 
GM. 
 Dissent of institutional nonblockholders (%): 
percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional 
nonblockholders voting against (or abstaining on) 
Section 1 of the Remuneration Report at the 2012 
GM.  
Firm characteristics: 
 Disclosure index: an index (ranging from 1 to 
6) of the quality of RR disclosure. It is the sum of six 
dummy variables, based on the disclosure of items 
potentially relevant for investors’ decisions: 1) 
Disclosure of pay composition (Fixed/Variable); 2) 
Disclosure of cap on variable compensation; 3) 
Disclosure of performance objectives; 4) Disclosure 
of multiple objectives for directors’ variable 
compensation; 5) Disclosure of variable 
compensation deferral and, finally 6) Disclosure of a 
cap on directors’ severance pay. 
 Log_CEO_Total_Compensation: natural log of 
cash (Fixed + Variable) + equity-based CEO 
compensation  
 CEO_%_Variable_Comp: variable cash 
compensation paid to the CEO as a percentage of 
total compensation 
 Log Total Assets: Natural log of Total Assets 
 M/B (Market to Book ratio): market value of  
equity divided by book value of equity 
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 ROA: Accounting returns (Last year’s 
EBITDA/Total Assets) 
 RET1Y: average dividend-adjusted stock 
returns over the last year prior to the shareholders’ 
meeting year. 
 SQM_RET: standard deviation of stock returns 
over the last year prior to the shareholders’ meeting 
year. 
 Cash_Flow_Rights: cash-flow rights held by 
the ultimate shareholder (US) after taking into 
account the whole chain of control (if US owns 50% 
of direct cash-flows of A and A owns 40% of direct 
cash-flows of B, then US owns ultimately 50%*40% = 
20% of cash-flows of B). 
 Remuneration Committee: a dummy variable 
taking value 1 if a Remuneration Committee has 
been established, and 0 otherwise. 
 Financial/Nonfinancial: a dummy variable 
taking value 1 for financial companies and 0 
otherwise. 
Proxy Advisors’ recommendations: 
 ISS_Against: a dummy variable taking value 1 
if ISS recommended voting “Against” Section 1 of 
the Remuneration Report and 0 otherwise 
 GL_Against: a dummy variable taking value 1 
if GL recommended voting “Against” Section 1 of the 
Remuneration Report and 0 otherwise 
 ISS&GL_Against: a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if both ISS and GL recommended voting 
“Against” Section 1 of the Remuneration Report and 
0 otherwise 
 Only_ISS: a dummy variable taking value 1 if 
ISS recommended voting “Against” Section 1 of the 
Remuneration Report while GL recommended voting 
“For” or issued no recommendation, and 0 otherwise 
 Only_GL: a dummy variable taking value 1 if 
GL recommended voting “Against” Section 1 of the 
Remuneration Report while ISS recommended voting 
“For” or issued no recommendation, and 0 otherwise 
 Number of concerns: number of reasons of 
concern expressed either by ISS (or, respectively, GL) 
 Single concern: a dummy variable taking value 
1 if ISS (or, respectively, GL) expresses only one 
reason of concern, and 0 otherwise 
 Multiple concerns: a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if ISS (or, respectively, GL) expresses multiple 
reasons of concern, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Appendix 2. Description of ISS and GL concerns 
 
Table A. Frequency of individual reasons for concern in ISS reports 
 
Concerns Frequency of concerns 
Severance pay >24 months' pay 35 
Compensation structure and long-term value creation 103 
The compensation committee includes executives 20 
Basic features of remuneration policy not disclosed 81 
The report was not made available in a timely manner 1 
Total 240 
Table A reports the frequency of individual reasons of concern underlined by ISS in the “Analysis” section of the 
Report issued for the 2012 AGMs. Multiple reasons for concern may be expressed for a single company. 
 
Table B. Description of GL concerns 
 
Frequency of individual concerns on compensation structure 
Excessive severance 
agreements 
Long-term Performance 
Implementation of best practices 
(only for FTSE Mib companies) 
Other 
structure 
concerns 
35 87 117 28 23 
Frequency of individual concerns on compensation disclosure 
Description of 
hurdles/targets not 
disclosed 
Implementation of Best 
Practices 
(only for FTSE Mib companies) 
Vesting schedules of 
awards not disclosed 
Performance metrics (or relative 
weights) not disclosed 
Other 
concerns 
54 24 12 52 15 
 
Table C. Joint distribution of ISS and GL recommendations on SOP 
 
 
GL “FOR” GL “AGAINST” 
ISS “FOR” 65 (39%) 18 (11%) 
ISS “AGAINST” 51 (31%) 33 (20%) 
Agreement 59%  
Agreement on controversial cases 32% 
 
